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Totalizing identities
The ambiguous legacy of Aristotle and
Hegel after Auschwitz
Abstract The Holocaust throws the study of the history of philosophy
into crisis. Critiques of Western thinking leveled by such thinkers as
Adorno, Levinas and, more recently, postmodern theorists have suggested
that Western philosophy is inherently totalizing and that it must be read
differently or altogether abandoned after Auschwitz. This article intention-
ally rereads Aristotle and Hegel through the shattered lens of the Holocaust.
Its refracted focus is the question of ontological identity. By investigating
the manner in which the totalizing dimensions of Aristotle’s thinking are
both eclipsed and implicitly endorsed by Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle’s
conception of God, and further by following the surplus of Hegel’s
(mis)interpretation back into the heart of Aristotle’s ontology where we find
a more open conception of ontological identity, we come to recognize not
only the dangers endemic to certain strands of traditional philosophical
thinking, but also the resources this tradition itself brings to bear on the
attempt to think ontological identity after Auschwitz.
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Insgeheim ist Nichtidentität das Telos der Identifikation, das an ihr zu
Rettende; der Fehler des traditionellen Denkens, daß es die Identität für
sein Ziel halt. (Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik)
In the wake of the atrocities of the 20th century, it may seem anach-
ronistic to speak again of ontological identity. Surely, the strong indict-
ments leveled against both ontology and identity by such thinkers as
Emmanuel Levinas and Theodor Adorno are enough to convince us to
reject all talk of ontological identity as symptomatic of a kind of
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thinking that is inherently totalizing.1 Indeed, both Levinas and Adorno,
whatever their differences may be, operate from the common intuition
that the Holocaust was made possible by certain tendencies endemic to
Western philosophical thinking. More recently, a number of ‘post-
modern’ theorists have deepened this line of criticism by suggesting that
the Holocaust was no mere aberration, but rather the most extreme
expression of the modern mind-set that seeks to render the world absol-
utely rational by purging it of everything Other.2 Ironically, of course,
such categorical indictments of modernity and, by extension, of the
entire history from which modernity emerged, themselves operate with
the same sort of totalizing conception of identity they are designed to
undermine. To posit an ultimate ‘post’ over against a totalizing ‘mod-
ernity’ is to collude in precisely the sort of totalizing thinking post-
modernism rightly intends to overcome.
Yet there is something convincing about such indictments, for
surely there is a deep strand of thinking that runs through the history
of Western philosophy that can fairly be called ‘totalizing’, if not expli-
citly totalitarian. One example of this sort of totalizing thinking can
be found in Aristotle’s conception of ontological identity as expressed
in book XII of his Metaphysics in his treatment of God as thought
thinking itself. In this text, Aristotle explicitly seeks to establish a firm
order for his metaphysical system by purging the principle of potency
from God’s being. This strategy is totalizing insofar as it secures
identity for the sake of order by doing away with difference. This
ancient idea is translated into modern thinking by Hegel, who saw in
Aristotle’s conception of God the very principle of modern subjecti-
vity.3 This, of course, is not without a great deal of irony, for no one
knew better than Hegel that there is no identity without difference,
that, indeed, the subject wins its own identity only through the positing
and determinate negating of difference.4 Thus, in order to accomplish
this translation of Aristotle’s thinking, Hegel must systematically ignore
Aristotle’s attempts to do away completely with difference. Despite 
this misreading, the totalizing dimension of Aristotle’s thinking seeps
into Hegel’s own conception of identity under the guise of the all-
absorbing dialectic of the subject in which difference is posited and
affirmed, only in order then to be overcome. Here, Aristotle’s totaliz-
ing metaphysics in which God is posited as the most authoritative prin-
ciple is transformed into a metaphysics of mere toleration in which the
subject freely posits and then overcomes difference in order to estab-
lish its own identity. Given this, it is no surprise that in their critiques
of the totalizing tendencies of modernity, Adorno, Levinas and a
number of more recent theorists focus on what Jean-Luc Nancy calls
the ‘modern ideology of identity’ and specifically on the Hegelian phil-
osophy of the subject.5
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However, Hegel’s misinterpretation of Aristotle is also highly
instructive, for it suggests the possibility that in Aristotle not only might
we locate the seeds of a very dangerous kind of thinking, but also, we
might uncover another notion of ontological identity latent in him, per-
verted neither by the tendency to posit God as the ultimate authoritative
principle nor by the modern metaphysics of the all-absorbing subject.
Precisely such a conception of identity is suggested by Aristotle at the
end of his discussion of sensible substance in the middle books of the
Metaphysics and is developed to some inchoate extent in the Nico-
machean Ethics. In Metaphysics book IX, Aristotle suggests the possi-
bility that the identity of energeia and dynamis may be thought in terms
of praxis. With this vocabulary, Aristotle leaves off the hyper-rational
impulse to reduce all difference to identity, taking up instead the much
more difficult challenge to think identity without doing away with
difference. Some insight into how such a conception of identity may
function is then hinted at within the context of the discussion of
phrone¯sis found in Nicomachean Ethics book VI. Thus, by investigating
the manner in which the totalizing dimensions of Aristotle’s thinking
are both eclipsed and implicitly endorsed by Hegel’s appropriation of
Aristotle’s conception of God, and further by following the surplus of
Hegel’s misinterpretation back into the heart of Aristotle’s ontology
where we find a more open conception of ontological identity, we come
to recognize not only the dangers endemic to certain strands of traditional
philosophical thinking, but also the resources this tradition itself brings
to bear on the attempt to think ontological identity after Auschwitz.
Aristotle’s totalizing thinking
To argue that Aristotle’s conception of God as it is developed in Meta-
physics book XII is totalizing and to situate this argument within the
context of the challenges philosophy faces after Auschwitz is to risk a
profound misunderstanding; for it would be both irresponsible and
naïve to suggest that Aristotle was somehow a proto-Nazi. Yet it would
be equally irresponsible and naïve to suggest that the basic structure of
Western thinking had nothing whatsoever to do with the Holocaust.
Indeed, the entirety of Western philosophy is indicted by the Holocaust.
This indictment, however, does not render philosophy entirely and
exclusively culpable, rather it enjoins philosophy’s self-reflection and
immanent critique. Arguably, there is no one single thinker who has had
more influence on the structure of Western thinking than Aristotle;
whether we are aware of it or not, our thinking remains thoroughly
Aristotelian.6 For this reason, after the atrocities the West has wrought
in the 20th century, it is only natural to return to Aristotle with a critical
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eye, not to indict him for crimes against humanity, but to question those
strands of his philosophy that, through the centuries, have saturated our
thinking to such a degree that the effect of its influence is difficult to
discern.
One such strand can be found in Metaphysics book XII, where
Aristotle argues for a single, supreme, authoritative principle designed
to secure, once and for all, the coherence and order of the universe.
Historically, this text has often been interpreted as the highest expres-
sion and culmination of the Aristotelian metaphysics.7 The idea of a
single supreme principle is powerfully developed in Metaphysics book
XII, chapters 6–10. With the possible exception of chapter 8, in which
Aristotle – who may have been influenced by the astronomical insights
of Eudoxus and his pupil Callippus – suggests that there may be a multi-
plicity of prime movers, the argument developed in chapters 6–10 hangs
together quite well and lends instructive insight into what is being called
the totalizing dimension of Aristotle’s thinking.8
The main concern that informs Aristotle’s discussion in chapters
6–10 is the problem of order. To this extent, this text resonates with a
main preoccupation of Western thinking in general, namely, the desire
to affirm order in a world of flux. Richard Bernstein calls this desire
‘Cartesian Anxiety’, suggesting by this term the very human impulse to
seek some permanent fixed point upon which to orient and stabilize the
world in the face of the vagaries of finite existence.9 What Bernstein
describes as ‘Cartesian’ could equally have been called ‘Aristotelian’,10
as the same anxiety informs Aristotle’s conception of God. To put it
strongly: Aristotle posits the monarchy of God so as to secure order
over anarchic disorder. In so doing, however, he engages in a totalizing
strategy that perceives difference as the ultimate threat to order and thus
systematically seeks to reduce all otherness to the same.
The characteristics ascribed to God throughout chapters 6 through
10 bear this out. In the face of the transitory nature of the world,
Aristotle posits a principle eternal and unmoved.11 Over against the har-
rowing contingency of existence, he posits a necessary principle that is
separate and unaffectable.12 Finally, over the vast plurality of beings, he
posits the simple, which, strictly speaking, cannot rightfully be called
‘monarchic’, for oneness would be too diverse for it. Indeed, Aristotle
suggests that ‘one’ signifies a measure, while ‘simple’ only signifies a way
of being.13 God tolerates no difference. Such characterizations cohere
with the strategy of totalization insofar as they work together to estab-
lish the absolute authority of God, the ultimate principle of being,
towards which all is related and from which all is determined. A closer
look at each of these facets of God’s nature will deepen our under-
standing of the totalizing strategy that informs Aristotle’s thinking here.
As eternal, the first principle is subject neither to generation nor to
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destruction, but rather functions as the first source and ultimate guar-
antor of all motion in the universe.14 Here Aristotle’s primary concern
is to locate the ultimate final cause of motion so as to secure the basic
order of the cosmos. In so doing, however, he seems to have proved too
much, for the metaphor Aristotle deploys is that of the circle closed in
upon itself, a metaphor that secures order only to deny novelty. In a
perfectly cyclical universe, nothing new can ever happen, there is, to
borrow the Nietzschean term, an eternal recurrence of the same.15 The
first principle, itself immovable, causes the perennial circular motion of
the celestial bodies without itself being affected in any way. It is able to
do this because it causes the universe to move by desire.16 Ross correctly
recognizes the significance of the metaphor of desire when he suggests
that desire is the only conception of motion in Aristotle that is not 
reciprocal – the desired object stimulates without being itself stimu-
lated.17 This is precisely the sort of conception Aristotle must develop
if he is to establish the absolute authority of the ultimate principle of
order. The necessary condition for such a position is that that which
moves is absolutely unaffected by that which it moves.
By making the first principle order all by desire, Aristotle accom-
plishes two things at once. First, he secures the absolute independence
and self-sufficiency of the first principle. This is reaffirmed at the end of
chapter 7 when Aristotle writes: ‘It is apparent from the things having
been said that there exists some eternal and immovable substance having
separated itself [kecho¯risme¯] from the sensible things.’18 Here the perfect
participle of the verb cho¯rizein – to separate, to divide – is employed.
In Greek, the perfect tense expresses completed aspect in present time.
By using the perfect participle here and, further, by placing this partici-
ple in the middle voice,19 Aristotle is simultaneously able to emphasize
God’s ultimate independence, His total perfection and His absolute self-
sufficiency. Second, by deploying the metaphor of desire as the model
by which the first mover moves, Aristotle is able to transform the
external imposition of authority into a sort of immanent principle of
the governed. This transference is decisive, for it indicates how
thoroughly the first principle saturates everything that can in any way
be said to be. The first principle has been infused into the very being of
the ruled; it has become, we are told, what the ruled themselves desire.20
The totalizing strategy emerges out of an attempt to establish the
absolute authority of the first principle. If Aristotle’s thinking here were
only authoritarian and not totalizing as well, the scope and power of
the first principle would have been limited, and there would have
remained an Other outside its purview.21 The manner in which the
authoritarian dimension of Aristotle’s thinking becomes genuinely total-
izing can be clearly seen in the famous formulation of God as ‘the
thinking of thinking’:
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First, then, if He is not thinking, but potentiality, it is reasonable to say
that holding together His own thinking would be wearisome. Thereupon,
it would be clear that something other [allo ti] would be more honorable
than thought, namely, that which is thought, for to think or thinking belong
also to that which thinks the worst things, with the result that if this must
be avoided (for some things are better not to see than to see), thinking
would not be the best. Therefore, He thinks Himself, if indeed it is the best,
and thinking is the thinking of thinking [noesis noeseo¯s].22
Two aspects of this passage are particularly striking. First, Aristotle
explicitly rejects the possibility that there is any dimension of poten-
tiality in God. There can be no potentiality here, for, on the abstract
level, potentiality would infect the nobility of God’s existence, and on
the practical level, if God had to constantly overcome potentiality, He
would become weary and His eternal nature would be threatened. This
rejection of potentiality is symptomatic of Aristotle’s totalizing strategy.
Indeed, it has already been implicitly established in chapters 6 and 7
wherever Aristotle insists on the simplicity of the first principle, its pure
actuality and its existence ‘without matter’.23 These formulations are all
expressions of the tendency to do away with difference, for difference
has traditionally been taken as a patent threat to the order of things.
The second striking aspect of the above passage is the manner in
which Aristotle actually arrives at the allegedly radical and visionary
formulation that God is ‘the thinking of thinking’.24 This formulation
turns out to be Aristotle’s only real alternative, for if God was thinking
anything other than Himself, then it would by definition be inferior and
less excellent. Thus, Aristotle arrives at ‘noesis noeseo¯s’ by default. It
does appear, however, that when this formula is taken in isolation, the
genitive seems to import a dimension of difference into the structure of
the first principle insofar as it differentiates the activity of thinking from
the object thought. But when read within the context of the larger dis-
cussion of God, this genitive cannot be understood as a means by which
to express difference in identity; rather, it is only the ultimate reaffirm-
ation of the Same. If His authority is to remain absolute – as it must if
He is to fulfill His foundational function as the ultimate principle of
order – God cannot think anything other than Himself.
Admittedly, some of the metaphors Aristotle uses to establish the
first principle do not always reinforce the explicit attempts to do away
with difference that are rife throughout the text. This is particularly
clear in the most famous and poetic section of chapter 7, where Aristotle
establishes the analogy between the thinking of God and the thinking
of human beings by deploying the problematic metaphor of life to
describe the nature of God’s existence.
The analogy with human thinking, which resonates in vocabulary
and formulation with the complicated discussion of the similarities
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between thinking and sensation in the De Anima, is set up by Aristotle
only to be immediately transcended.25 Indeed, Aristotle’s formulation is,
quite literally, wonderful: ‘If, then, God exists well always, as we exist
but only sometimes, it is most wonderful [thaumaston]; but if He exists
more, this is yet more wonderful [thaumasio¯teron]. And God exists in
the latter way.’26 These are powerful words coming from the father of
prosaic prose. To place the comparative after the superlative – more
wonderful than the most wonderful – is to point to an existence beyond
the bounds of human expression. It is to reaffirm the absolute authority
of God, not beyond being itself, but rather as the highest principle of
being.
Following the analogy with human being further, Aristotle speaks
of God’s wonderful existence in terms of ‘life’. ‘We say that God is a
living being that is eternal and best, with the result that life and con-
tinuous duration and eternity belong to God, for this is God.’27 Here
God is called ‘living’ because He is not only eternal, but also respons-
ible for the continuous duration of the universe. Indeed, two separate
functions are ascribed to a single principle; on the one hand, God is the
first principle of becoming, ruling by desire and maintaining the
constant order of the cosmos; on the other hand, God is the first prin-
ciple of being, existing eternally having been separated from the tran-
sient world of becoming. The question remains, however, as to whether
the metaphor of life is appropriate for either of these functions, for when
‘life’ comes to mean that which is devoid of difference, that which ‘can
in no way be other than it is’,28 that which is in no wise potential, then
surely it has ceased to retain either its original meaning or its explana-
tory value.
Obviously, the metaphor is important, and to insist on its impro-
priety is not to critique the impulse that may have driven Aristotle to
deploy it. Indeed, perhaps it is the impulse itself that should be affirmed,
for the concept of ‘life’, because it cannot be thought in isolation from
the otherness that in part determines it, is anathema to the totalizing
strategy deployed throughout this text. Perhaps its appearance here indi-
cates the extent to which Aristotle was at odds with himself. Yet even
here, Aristotle is intent on emphasizing the supremacy and purity of
God’s actuality: ‘His actuality is in virtue of itself a life that is the best
and is eternal.’29 As pure actuality, God must be totally devoid of all
potency, and Aristotle, despite the genitive in the ‘noesis noeseo¯s’ formu-
lation and despite the metaphor of life, is intent on securing His supreme
authority by purging from His being any principle of difference that
may undermine His power.30
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Totalizing tropes
The two different functions ascribed to the ultimate principle – its role
as the final cause of motion and as the highest principle of being – lead
Aristotle to consider the precise manner in which it establishes the good
in the world. For, in its former role, it would make sense to suggest
that the first principle, being itself good, is inherent in the order of the
world, while in its later role, it would seem more appropriate if it were
somehow transcendent of the order, instilling its goodness in the world
from outside. The two tropes Aristotle employs to clarify his position
are rather revealing. He suggests that perhaps the situation is some-
thing like that obtaining in an army where the good is both in the order
and in the general. And immediately upon this suggestion, Aristotle
hastens to add: ‘and it is rather in the general, for he is not because of
the order, but the order is because of him.’31 Here Aristotle is again
concerned to maintain the order of the world by positing the absolute
authority of the general over the order he establishes. Indeed, Aristotle
goes on to assert that ‘all things are ordered in relation to one thing’,32
and that this situation is analogous to the manner in which the order
of the household is secured; for the freemen, who themselves are least
at liberty to act randomly, set the household in order and control the
slaves and livestock, who tend toward anarchic activity.33 Thus, just as
God cannot be other than He is and exists according to the highest
necessity in order to establish and maintain the order of the universe,
so too are the generals and the freemen less able to act however they
wish in order to establish and maintain order in the army and house-
hold respectively.
These two tropes, the general and the head of the household, do not
merely serve as illuminating metaphors that allow us to better under-
stand the nature of the existence of the highest principle, they also hint
at the extent to which Aristotle’s metaphysical position is determined
by political thinking. In both analogies, the absolute authority of the
highest principle is not to be challenged and good rule depends on the
subsumption of all opposition to the authority of the ruler. Thus,
Aristotle writes at the end of book X, ‘beings don’t want to be governed
badly’ and, quoting Odysseus from book II of the Iliad, he concludes
that ‘the rule of many is not good, let one the ruler be’.34 Here again
the maneuver of transference is manifest, for the imposition of order
does not seem so violent when the desire for it is ascribed to the
governed. And yet, the structure of this way of thinking is totalizing at
its very core, for it is a basic feature of totalitarian regimes not only to
subvert all opposition, but also to impose their own position on the
governed by passing it off as something the governed themselves
desire.35
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According to Hannah Arendt, for modern totalitarian regimes,
ideology accomplishes this sort of transference whereby the external rule
of the authority is internalized. 
Totalitarianism is never content to rule by external means, namely, through
the state and a machinery of violence; thanks to its peculiar ideology and
the role assigned to it in this apparatus of coercion, totalitarianism has dis-
covered a means of dominating and terrorizing human beings from
within.36
For Aristotle, the ideology of God as thought thinking itself, pure act
devoid of potency, operates as the ultimate principle of being. It is the
idea according to which the world is set in order.37 Thus, what emerges
from the preceding analysis is the manner in which this ultimate idea,
by assimilating all opposition and asserting its absolute authority, estab-
lishes a totalizing hegemony.
From God to the subject – Hegel’s interpretation of
Aristotle’s Metaphysics
In order to determine to what extent this totalizing tendency finds its
way into the modern mind-set, we may turn to Hegel, who translates
into the language of modernity, and specifically that of modern subjec-
tivity, Aristotle’s conception of God as thought thinking itself.
Hegel divides his interpretation of the Metaphysics into three
moments: the moment of immediacy, in which form and matter remain
fundamentally distinct; the moment of activity, in which the more
dynamic terms of energeia and dynamis are introduced; and finally, the
highest stage of mediation in which the identity of energeia and dynamis
is thought in terms of pure activity.38 A brief outline of these three stages
will reveal the extent to which Hegel’s own conception of subjectivity
not only is determined by Aristotle’s understanding of God but also
retains something of the totalizing tendency endemic to it. On the other
hand, Hegel’s interpretation will also suggest the possibility of locating
another, less totalizing and more open conception of ontological identity
in Aristotle, a conception to which Hegel points but over which he steps
too swiftly.
Sensible substance
The first stage of Hegel’s interpretation of the Metaphysics is that of
finite sensible ousia.39 The fundamental characterization of finite ousia
is the external opposition between form and matter. Form and matter
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are here strictly distinct from one another and they remain in this mode
of opposition. For Hegel, the fact that this relationship remains external
is fundamental – it indicates that Aristotle’s thought at this stage remains
lifeless. He writes: ‘Matter is the dead substrate, the subject, “the ground
on which change happens”; matter suffers changes.’40 Here the concept
of matter is understood in terms of the hypokeimenon, that which
underlies all change. The conception of the hypokeimenon, however,
inadequately accounts for substantial generation, the kind of change
most important to Aristotle himself. Hegel correctly points this out by
implicitly referring to the opening lines of Metaphysics VII.7 and stress-
ing the externality of the relations offered there: 
Thus it is posited: a) matter, the universal being, substrate of change, indif-
ference to the opposition; b) the determinations, the negative, against one
another; c) the moving, the pure activity. Thus, the moments appear dis-
tinguished in sensible substance, but the return [Rückkehr] into themselves
does not yet appear.41
For Hegel this return of the moments into themselves is of decisive
importance – not only is it what accounts for the progression from the
first to the second moment, but also it expresses what for Hegel is
Aristotle’s most profound insight, namely that by taking its principle
into itself, ousia can become self-determining. It is the turning towards
one another of form and matter, the entering into relation and, ultimately,
the affirmation of this relation as the determining ground of its being
that Hegel sees as decisively important in Aristotle.
Effective substance: from matter to thought
In the turning towards one another of form and matter, Hegel continues,
a ‘higher kind’ of substance appears.42 Here, matter is thematized in
terms of dynamis and form in terms of energeia. However, according to
Hegel, form as energeia is further thematized in terms of the Under-
standing (Verstand, nous). Nous is here introduced as that activity which
in itself can preserve the diverse moments of becoming. Nous determines
the end towards which the process of becoming is directed. Hegel offers
this closer determination of the two moments that make up this second
stage of substance: ‘The two extremes are matter (possibility) and
thought (effectiveness) [Wirksamkeit], the first is the passive universal,
the second the active universal.’43 Here already, the direction of Hegel’s
interpretation is determined. The move will be toward pure thought,
where the material principle is aufgehoben, negated and preserved.
Yet, the question already arises: to what extent can it really be said
that difference is preserved in pure thought? Does not matter pollute
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the purity of thought? At this point in Hegel’s interpretation, however,
the dissolution of matter is only intimated and the present introduction
of the notion of nous may be recognized as merely the first symptom of
the continued efficacy of Aristotle’s old totalizing tendency – that is, the
tendency to seek refuge in pure thought as the ultimate principle. For
now, in this second moment, matter, the principle of difference, is per-
mitted to hold its own, and, although transformed by its thematization
in terms of dynamis, it is not altogether assimilated. Thus, difference
between thought and matter is posited: 
In sensible substance the active is still completely distinct from matter. Nous
is, however, in and for itself determinate, this content is actu; but the Under-
standing [Verstand, nous] thus still requires matter, with which it is not as
yet identical, matter is presupposed.44
At this juncture, the ‘two extremes’ are brought into relation with one
another but this relation itself is not understood as something funda-
mental. Thus, the second stage marks the relation between thought and
matter, but not their mutual ontological dependence.
Before adumbrating the final moment of Hegel’s reading of Aristotle’s
conception of ousia, the moment of identity, it is significant to note that
already here in the second moment, the dichotomy is established
between matter and thought, rather than, as in the Metaphysics itself,
between matter and form. Hegel seems to have the model of produc-
tion in mind here whereby the idea (eidos) of the architect is juxtaposed
to the matter upon which she or he works. This move to establish the
distinction between matter and nous rather than matter and form indi-
cates a certain hedging that is determined by the ultimate goal of Hegel’s
argument: to understand the Aristotelian conception of ousia in terms
of thought, and, therefore, to transform Aristotle into an idealist of the
greatest genius. Hegel makes no secret of this intention; in fact, it largely
determines his critique of contemporary commentators on Aristotle:
they see Aristotle as a mere empiricist, while Hegel recognizes him as
the first great idealist.45 However, the question with which we are here
concerned has not so much to do with the extent to which Hegel’s
interpretation of Aristotle is ‘correct’, but rather with the extent to
which what might be called this ‘idealistic move’ is itself a dangerous
remnant of the totalizing tendency endemic to Aristotle’s understanding
of the highest ousia.
Absolute substance
The ‘highest point’ of Aristotle’s thinking about substance occurs when
dynamis, energeia and entelecheia are united.46 For Hegel, this is
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accomplished by Aristotle in the conception of pure thought thinking
itself, noesis noeseo¯s; for, according to him, it is with this concept that
Aristotle thinks the identity of potentiality and actuality. In order to do
this, however, Hegel must read the moment of difference back into the
structure of the first principle. Given Aristotle’s own unequivocal rejec-
tion of potency and matter, any such interpretation requires a great deal
of hermeneutical acrobatics in which those passages where Aristotle
explicitly rejects the principle of difference are eclipsed by those passages
that deploy difference-affirming metaphors. Precisely such acrobatics
determine Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle’s God.
In response to Aristotle’s rather explicit denial that the first prin-
ciple includes matter,47 Hegel writes: ‘Here the manner in which a
predicate is merely denied without its truth being expressed is manifest;
matter is a moment of the unmoved being.’48 According to Hegel,
Aristotle’s rejection of matter is merely abstract and thus does not speak
the speculative truth because absolute substance must include the
moment of difference, the moment of matter. Although this insight
explains how Hegel can locate in Aristotle the discovery of the true
power of determining negation,49 it also elucidates the manner in which
Hegel systematically (mis)interprets Aristotle in such a way that his con-
ception of the highest principle expresses precisely what Hegel means
when he speaks of the speculative Idea, namely, that which remains self-
identical in difference. Indeed, when he is faced with the text from
chapter 9 in which Aristotle explicitly denies that the first principle can
in any way be in potency, Hegel simply cites it affirmingly and empha-
sizes the implication of this notion, namely, that thinking must think
nothing other than itself and thus that in its activity, it remains identi-
cal with itself.50 This sort of selective (mis)reading that downplays or
explains away Aristotle’s rather vigorous attempt to do away with the
principle of difference in order to read the moment of difference back
into the highest principle characterizes Hegel’s interpretation of
Aristotle throughout.
However, the obfuscating strategy Hegel most often deploys is that
of excessive praise. He focuses on and effusively endorses precisely those
elements of Aristotle’s thinking that resonate with his own conception
of identity. Thus, when Aristotle appeals to the totalizing metaphor of
the circle to explain the manner in which the unmoved mover moves
the universe, Hegel writes: ‘The unmoved that moves – this is Aristotle’s
great determination; that which remains self-identical, the Idea, which
moves and remains in relation with itself.’51 Here Hegel suggests that
Aristotle’s formulation resonates with his own determinations of sub-
jectivity, for like the subject of Hegel’s idealism, Aristotle’s unmoved
mover remains self-identical in its activity. Indeed, just as Hegel deter-
mines the I as the active unity of the subject and object,52 so too does
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he see in Aristotle’s conception of God an identity capable of holding
itself with itself in difference. Hegel writes: 
[God’s energy] is activity, movement, repulsion and thus not dead identity;
it is identity with itself in difference. If Aristotle had made the straw identity
of the understanding or experience into a principle, he would have never
arrived at the speculative idea. Possibility and actuality are identical; nous
is also dynamis, but not the universal possibility but rather singularity and
activity.53
For Hegel, Aristotle’s conception of God anticipates the modern con-
ception of subjectivity precisely because it retains a dimension of
potency.54 And yet, Aristotle himself is quite clear that, contrary to what
Hegel tells us here, the highest principle is a nous without dynamis; it
is pure actuality, devoid of any principle of difference that would under-
mine its authority.
If indeed Hegel systematically misinterprets Aristotle by importing
the moment of difference back into a principle that had been charac-
terized as totalizing precisely because it annihilated difference, does not
this misinterpretation itself constitute a genuine progressive improve-
ment of the Aristotelian position? Does not Hegel precisely read the
totalizing tendency out of Aristotle’s thinking, allowing it once again
to endorse difference?
To the extent that Hegel affirms difference, he moves beyond the
totalizing dimension of Aristotle’s thinking and establishes a more
tolerant conception of ontological identity. By translating Aristotle’s
understanding of God into the vocabulary of modern subjectivity, Hegel
has shattered the absolute monarchy of mind and uncovered its dynamic
internal structure. However, the very dialectical logic of subjectivity
retains something of the totalizing tendency of Aristotle’s thinking, for
difference is not affirmed in and of itself, but only as a moment of the
dynamic identity of the subject. Indeed, difference is tolerated only
insofar as it can be overcome; it exists for the sake of identity and is
not affirmed in its own right. To this extent, Hegel’s conception of sub-
jectivity, which deploys a metaphysics of toleration and assimilation,
remains totalizing in that it reduces difference to a moment of identity,
privileging always identity over difference. While the toleration of differ-
ence is a marked improvement over Aristotle’s explicit attempts to
annihilate difference altogether, it is not enough, for toleration continues
to operate within a logic of assimilation that seeks to establish identity
by overcoming otherness – difference is posited only in order that it may
be overcome.55
Although Hegel’s conception of subjectivity retains something of the
totalizing tendencies delineated in Aristotle, there is another dimension
of Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotle’s conception of noesis noeseo¯s that
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may be designated as totalizing in a more radical sense. This dimension
finds expression in Hegel’s attempt to establish the overarching import-
ance of thought. In this, Hegel recognizes a difference between his
thinking and Aristotle’s: 
[Aristotle] does not say, [thought] alone is true, that all is thought; but
rather, he says that it is the first, strongest, most honorable. We say that
thought, as that which relates itself to itself, is, that it is the truth. Further,
we say that thought is the whole truth, but Aristotle does not say this.56
Here, for the first time Hegel distances himself from Aristotle’s thinking.
The difference he delineates seems to be one of scope and radicality, for
Aristotle has yet to achieve the highest, most radical recognition of
speculative idealism, namely, that all is thought, that thought has the
capacity to penetrate all being, to comprehend it and saturate it fully
with meaning.
Recent critiques of modern thinking, particularly those concerned
with the relationship between modernity and the Holocaust, have sug-
gested that such an attempt to render everything rational finds its most
radical and destructive expression in Nazism’s hyper-rational, system-
atic attempt to annihilate the Jewish people.57 However, to recognize
the totalizing tendencies endemic to Western philosophical thinking
from its beginning is not to endorse the more radical critique of mod-
ernity that reads the Holocaust as the final destination of the modern
drive toward total rationalization. Rather, by exposing the totalizing
legacy of Western thought in Aristotle and Hegel, it is hoped that a
deeper appreciation of the extent to which Western philosophy is impli-
citly indebted to a structure of thinking that is inherently dangerous may
be achieved. But there is another motivation that animates this arche-
logy, for although the totalizing tendency in Western thinking is strong,
it is by no means the only mode of thinking discernible in the diverse
and fecund tradition of the Occident.58 Within this tradition, indeed, in
the thinking of Aristotle itself, there appear ideas and tropes that are
potentially instructive for the attempt to think a non-totalizing concep-
tion of ontological identity in which the tension between identity and
difference is held without ultimately privileging the One over the Other
for the sake of security and order.
Reconsidering Aristotle
In fact, it is Hegel’s interpretation of Aristotle’s thinking that leads us
back to Aristotle with new ears. By pointing to Aristotle’s ultimate
unwillingness to reduce all things to thought and by suggesting that
there is in Aristotle a deep desire to do justice to difference, Hegel hints
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at the possibility that there may be in Aristotle another conception of
ontological identity that is not guided by the ultimate desire to estab-
lish order by doing away with difference. However, this other concep-
tion of ontological identity, if it itself is not to succumb to the totalizing
tendencies of the tradition from which it emerges, cannot allow itself
to be perverted by modern subjectivity. Indeed, the return to Aristotle
is animated, at least in part, by the need to step back behind the
ideology of the subject, which, as we have suggested, is itself little more
than an appropriation of Aristotle’s totalizing conception of God
mapped onto the modern ‘discovery’ of the radical autonomy of the
subject. 
Ironically, our rehearsal of Hegel’s own appropriation of Aristotle
suggests precisely where this other conception of ontological identity
may be found in Aristotle – for we saw how Hegel, in his impetuous
desire to establish the relation between matter and nous so as ultimately
to affirm the absolute authority of thinking, eclipses the important
relationship between matter and eidos, form. With this shift in focus
from eidos to nous, and, further, with the swift move from the second
moment of the development of the speculative idea in which difference
is maintained and affirmed to the third moment in which identity and
difference are reconciled in the ultimate figure of God, Hegel points to
and quickly covers over that moment of Aristotle’s thinking that points
to a non-totalizing conception of ontological identity. In order to
retrieve this moment from the powerful flow of Hegel’s dialectical
interpretation,59 it is necessary to pause at the moment of difference and
focus on the difficult middle books of the Metaphysics where, having
realized that ‘to do away with matter is useless effort’,60 Aristotle is not
obsessed with establishing the most authoritative, highest, first principle
of being; rather, he is intent on thinking the dynamic identity of the
concrete composite individual. This shift in focus allows Aristotle to
relinquish the totalizing tendency to reject difference for the sake of
stability and order and allows him to think his way into the ambiguous
identity of the individual itself.
Following the trajectory of the middle books, it is possible to suggest
that by the end of book VII, Aristotle has reached an impasse in his
attempt to develop a coherent interpretation of the being of sensible
ousia precisely because of the conflicting claims imposed upon it by
matter and form.61 This difficulty forces Aristotle to reformulate the
manner of his questioning concerning ousia. Rather than asking, ‘What
is ousia?’, Aristotle suggests the more succinct question: ‘Why is the
matter some one thing?’62 This question shifts the focus of Aristotle’s
attention to the question of the ontological identity of the individual
and specifically to the relation between form and matter. With this,
however, the main issue becomes the attempt to think the manner in
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which, as Aristotle himself says at the end of book VIII, form and matter,
now having been translated into the more dynamic terms of energeia
and dynamis respectively, can be understood to be somehow (po¯s) one
and the same.63
The indeterminacy of this ‘somehow’, rather than taking away from
the power of Aristotle’s account, actually injects it with a new and highly
significant, though largely underdeveloped, dimension of openness. In
Metaphysics book IX, Aristotle develops a conception of dynamis and
energeia that extends beyond the traditional manner in which these had
been understood in antiquity; for, as Aristotle points out, the most
proper senses of the terms had applied to beings in motion: that which
exists in potency does not yet exist actually and when it comes into
actuality, it ceases to exist potentially, at least with respect to that aspect
of the being that is in motion.64 However, in book IX, Aristotle is con-
cerned to develop a conception of the relation between energeia and
dynamis beyond the order of motion in order to think the dynamic being
of the finite individual itself.
This he does in chapter 6, when he introduces a distinction between
motion (kine¯sis) and activity (energeia) by suggesting that an activity,
unlike a motion, is not determined by some external goal, but rather
has its end in itself. This sort of activity Aristotle calls ‘praxis’,65 action,
designating with this term the activity according to which the relation
between energeia and dynamis may be thought. Aristotle determines the
nature of this sort of praxis with a very peculiar formulation. He says
that in such actions, the same thing, for example, ‘is seeing and has seen
[eo¯rake] at the same time, and likewise is practically wise and has been
practically wise [pephrone¯ke], is thinking and has thought [nenoe¯ken]
. . . is living well and has lived well [eze¯ken], is happy and has been
happy [eudaimone¯ken]’.66 The peculiar formulation Aristotle deploys
here, placing the present tense of the verb next to an iteration of the
same verb in the perfect tense, has been a source of debate among
scholars for some time.67
However, one possible interpretation is that Aristotle is here groping
for a conception of ontological identity that would do justice to differ-
ence, with its concomitant dimension of uncertainty and instability, while
affirming the basic order in which such an activity is always inscribed.
On such a reading, the perfect, with its completed aspect in present time,
would emphasize the historicity of the being whose identity is this
activity. Thus, the perfect would affirm the formal continuity between
generations with which Aristotle is so often concerned.68 It would
reinforce not only the biological but also the social-political truth that
part of what constitutes the identity of such a being is its history, the
place and family into which it is born, the context in which it is always
already situated.
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Aristotle begins to infuse a certain dimension of uncertainty and
instability into this conception of ontological identity by claiming that
such an action has its end in itself.69 Unlike a motion (kine¯sis), which
is (pre-)determined by an external goal and dies upon the achievement
of that goal, a praxis has its end in itself; it is an entelecheia. This dimen-
sion of praxis is destabilizing to some extent, for it situates the principle
of determination in the activity itself – it renders the being free and self-
determining. The temporal dimension towards which this aspect of the
ontological identity of praxis is directed is the future. Yet it is import-
ant not, as some have, to become overly intoxicated with this dimen-
sion of praxis; for while it is liberating indeed, when given absolute
priority, it is also potentially dangerous, for it can lead to the delusion
endemic to subjective idealism in which all exists as a determination of
the subject.70 Aristotle’s notion of praxis tempers this sort of intoxi-
cation in two ways, first by emphasizing the importance of historicity
in the appeal to the perfect, and second by emphatically affirming the
present.
In fact, Aristotle affirms the present in a twofold fashion as he
develops the meaning of praxis in Metaphysics IX.6. First, as mentioned,
the perfect tense in Greek is present in time. What distinguishes it from
the present tense is its aspect – the perfect has completed, while the
present has progressive/repeated aspect. Thus, by placing the perfect
next to the present in the manner Aristotle does in his rather strange
formulation of the happening of praxis, he offers a doubled emphasis
on the importance of the present. Indeed, it is the present tense, with its
progressive aspect, that takes on enormous significance in this formu-
lation; for such an action can hold itself together, so to speak, only so
long as it is in its activity (en-ergeia), that is, so long as it is the ongoing
activity of mediating between its history and its future, its matter and
its form, dynamis and energeia. To conceptualize the concrete compos-
ite in terms of ontological praxis is to think one’s way into the inher-
ently ambiguous identity of the finite individual itself. In the end,
however, Aristotle subverts the ambiguity of the finite individual and
the instability and uncertainty it quite literally embodies by positing the
ultimate authority of God as the principle of order. The individual is
sacrificed in the name of stability, ambiguity traded for the sense, at
least, of certainty and ultimate meaning. However, in the Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle, having turned his attention away from the necessary
and certain in order to think his way into the contingency of finite exist-
ence, develops a conception of knowledge capable of critically engaging
the ambiguous finitude of the identity of the composite individual
itself.71 Although he develops it in relation to human praxis, the struc-
ture of phrone¯sis lends insight into the nature and significance of onto-
logical praxis and the unstable identity to which it points.
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There are two dimensions of phrone¯sis that make it particularly
effective in addressing the contingent individual whose identity is under-
stood in terms of ontological praxis.72 First, Aristotle insists that
phrone¯sis is directed toward the individual.73 The individual, not the
arbitrary freedom of the subject, is decisive for phrone¯sis. Phronetic
judgment recognizes that whatever truth it contains ultimately depends
upon its ability to do justice to the concrete presence of the individual
with which it is concerned. From this perspective, the ontological signifi-
cance of this ethical form of judgment can hardly be underestimated;
for if the logic of ethical phrone¯sis is understood in relation to the notion
of ontological praxis developed above, the concrete presence of the indi-
vidual emerges as decisive for all ontological judgment. Thus, if onto-
logical praxis grants a certain priority to the present over the past and
the future, it is because what might now be called ontological phrone¯sis
insists that the concrete encounter with the individual is the ultimate
principle of all ontological judgment, that toward which phrone¯sis is
directed and to which it must remain accountable. However, this
encounter itself is never purely immediate; rather, it is always mediated
by the burdens of the past and the hopes for the future, by the demands
of the individual and the concepts of the judging subject.
This points already to the second dimension of phrone¯sis to be high-
lighted in this context. Although it remains always directed toward the
individual, phrone¯sis nevertheless deploys universal concepts; for it is
only through the deployment of concepts that an identifiable identity
may be ascribed to the individual. However, because this identity is con-
tingent, emerging only out of the concrete encounter with the individual,
which is itself not, like the object of episte¯me¯ or sophia, necessary,
phrone¯sis cannot allow itself to be duped by the illusion that its concepts
capture completely the very being of the individual with which it is con-
cerned. The concrete presence of the individual resists the totalizing
thrust of the concept. Thus, the universals deployed in ontological
phrone¯sis cannot be rigid, for though their deployment is the condition
for the possibility of meaningful relation, they must remain loyal to the
contingency of the being with which they are concerned and cognizant
of their own inherent finitude.
There are two aspects of phrone¯sis that allow it to resist the delusion
of its own authority. First, Aristotle links phrone¯sis closely to synesis,
or conscientious apprehension.74 Because phrone¯sis is itself always
embedded in a concrete context with others with whom it must be con-
cerned, and further, because it must deploy concepts in determining
these relations, its apprehension must always be conscientious – it must
remain vigilantly aware of the violence endemic to each act of judgment
and assiduously intent on doing justice to the individual with which it
is concerned. By linking phrone¯sis to synesis, Aristotle fundamentally
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undermines the idealistic model of free subjectivity, predicated as it is
on the alleged authority of an isolated autonomous subject. Second,
Aristotle claims that phrone¯sis must operate with epieikeia, or equity,
which is the ability to correct universal laws when they fail to do justice
to the individual because they are abstractly applied.75 Synesis and
epieikeia equip phrone¯sis with the capacity to be critically cognizant of
the dangerous and totalizing dimensions of its own act of judgment.
Ontological phrone¯sis recognizes that something like ontological
identity only first becomes accessible as the finite concepts that deter-
mine the relation between the Same and the Other are deployed. Thus,
if it remains possible to speak of identity at all, it must be the ambigu-
ous, open, unstable identity that emerges out of this concrete, contin-
gent relation. To speak of the identity of the Other as if it were
immediately accessible and objectively present is to embrace a conceit
that refuses to recognize the finite contingency of the concepts through
which all ontological identity is determined.
Once ontological praxis is thematized in relation to phrone¯sis, a
conception of ontological identity that undermines the totalizing ten-
dencies both of Aristotle’s conception of God and of Hegel’s free sub-
jectivity begins to emerge. Such a conception of identity would not be
the totalizing identity of God because it would not reject potency, but
rather recognize and affirm potency as the destabilizing force that
enjoins openness and a vigilant willingness to critically evaluate the prin-
ciples according to which identity is determined. And it would not quite
be the self-positing identity of modern subjectivity, for it would not be
so enthralled with its own liberty as to mistake its conceptual determi-
nations as the objective identity of the being with which it is concerned.
Rather, as always already embedded in and held accountable to its
relation to the Other, every determination of the identity of praxis would
be guided by the attempt to do justice to the concrete presence of the
individual, rather than by an obsession for absolute truth, stability and
security. Thus, it would not be determined by the free, arbitrary act of
the subject, but by the inter-subjective ability to respond to the Other.
Indeed, response-ability is the very meaning of ontological praxis; for it
emerges out of the contingent relation of response between the Same
and the Other.
Aristotle and Hegel after Auschwitz
Obviously, the conception of ontological praxis outlined above is only
vaguely suggested by Aristotle. It is, indeed, a distorted picture of
Aristotle from which emerges the possibility of thinking, quite literally,
a different identity – or, perhaps better, an ontology of relation and
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responsibility. The distortion, of course, arises not only from Hegel’s
appropriation of Aristotle and the limits and resources his (mis)interpre-
tation offers, but also, and more fundamentally, from the shattered lens
of Auschwitz through which not only Aristotle and Hegel, but the entire
history of Western thinking must unavoidably be read. In the face of
the horrors of the Holocaust, this sort of distortion of history is no mere
regrettable loss – such a thought would be no more than naïve roman-
ticism – but rather, distortion has become an ethical imperative of all
thinking intent on engaging the history of Western philosophy. However,
to argue that the hermeneutics of distortion is an ethical imperative for
the historian of philosophy is not to suggest that any arbitrary view can
be read into historical texts. Rather, it is to take seriously the place from
which we read and the fact that, interposed between us and them, is an
abyss that imposes itself upon us, enjoining us to read them through it.
This need not be an injunction to give up on philosophy, on Hegel,
Aristotle or any other thinker of the Western canon. Rather, it demands
the much more difficult itinerary whereby we respond to these thinkers
from the historical context in which we find ourselves. If the history of
Western philosophy is to be a resource for thinking after Auschwitz,
then it cannot be uncritically appropriated, for it has been inevitably
distorted, rendered ambiguous. Yet it is precisely this distortion and
ambiguity that, when read responsibly through the shattered lens of
history, open up new hermeneutical horizons – horizons that suggest
something other than a legacy of totalizing thinking.
Richard Stockton College, Pomona, NJ, USA
Notes
1 See, for example, Levinas, 1969: 42–8. There Levinas writes: ‘Western
philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the
same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the compre-
hension of being.’ Adorno, for his part, writes of his own negative dialec-
tics: ‘Its movement does not tend to the identity in difference between each
object and its concept. Rather, it is suspicious of identity. Its logic is one of
disintegration, of the disintegration of the prepared and presented form of
the concept which the cognizing subject has immediately over against it.
Their identity with the subject is untruth. . . . The quintessence of identical
definitions would correspond to the desired ideal of traditional philosophy,
to the a priori structure and to its archaistic late form, ontology. This
structure . . . is spiritualized coercion.’ See Adorno, 1966: 148. For the
English, see Adorno, 1994: 145. Future references will cite the German
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edition followed by the English edition. Translations from German and
Greek texts are my own throughout.
2 See, for example, Lacoue-Labarthe, 1990: 35: ‘In the Auschwitz apocalypse,
it was nothing less than the West, in its essence, that revealed itself.’ In a
similar vein, Zygmunt Bauman’s article, ‘Postmodernity, or Living with
Ambivalence’, suggests that the structural principle of modernity ‘was bent
on dominating the rest of the world by dissolving its alterity and assimilat-
ing the product of dissolution’. See Natoli and Hutcheon, 1993: 11. Jean-
Luc Nancy has recognized, not that fascism is an inevitable result of Western
thinking, but that it has always been ‘a possibility of Western thought’, and
to ignore this fact is irresponsible. See Nancy, 1990: 107. For a good,
detailed and subtle discussion of the relationship between recent ‘post-
modern’ theory and the Holocaust, see Milchman and Rosenberg, 1998.
3 In his Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Hegel writes: ‘The
Platonic philosophy is, in general, the objective, but the principle of life, of
subjectivity is most proper to Aristotle, and it is not an accidental but rather
a pure subjectivity.’ See Hegel, 1996: 68.
4 This dialectic of determinate negation by which the subject wins its identity
is powerfully expressed in the famous Vorrede to the Phänomenologie des
Geistes where Hegel thinks substance precisely as subject: ‘Further, the
living substance is being which is, in truth, Subject, or what is the same,
that which in truth actually is only insofar as it is the movement of self-
positing or the mediation of its becoming other with itself. It is, as subject,
pure simple negativity, and for this reason the bifurcation of the simple, or
the doubling that sets up opposition which is again the negation of this
indifferent difference and its opposite. Only this self-restoring sameness or
the reflection in otherness within itself – not an original or immediate unity
as such – is the true.’ See Hegel, 1986: III, 23; G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomen-
ology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977),
p. 10.
5 Adorno, for example, recognizes in Hegel a concern for order that is itself
highly Aristotelian: ‘For Hegel, order is good a priori, without its needing
to answer to those living under it. Ironically, this conforms with his later
reminiscence on Aristotle that “substantial unity is an absolute unmoved
end in itself”’ (Adorno, 1966: 331/337). In a similar vein, Levinas writes:
‘Hegel returns to Descartes in maintaining the positivity of the infinite, but
excluding all multiplicity from it; he posits the infinite as the exclusion of
every “other” that might maintain a relation with the infinite and thereby
limit it. The infinite can only encompass all relations. Like the god of
Aristotle it refers only to itself, though now at the term of a history’
(Levinas, 1969: 196). Nancy argues powerfully that ‘the modern ideology
of identity [du propre], of the intimate, of roots, has behind it, in whatever
way, exactly the philosophy of the subject. Meaning, above all, of course,
the Hegelian subject, that is, the Mind insofar as it is the ability to “contain
within itself its own contradiction.” Indeed, the “contradiction” opens onto
it – but it is stitched into it, reabsorbed. And to that extent, the philosophy
of the Subject signifies the infinite appropriation of exteriority’ (Nancy,
1990: 110). Finally, David Patterson has leveled a strong critique of the
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German philosophy of the subject from Kant through Hegel to Heidegger,
suggesting that this sort of thinking ultimately culminates in Nazism. See
Patterson, 1999: 163.
6 When we speak of objects with essential and non-essential properties, we
are thinking with the Aristotle of the Categories. Michael Frede has recog-
nized this in his essay ‘Substance in Aristotle’s Metaphysics’; see Frede,
1987: 72. When we calculate the amount and type of material needed to
construct anything, or when we delineate the causes of things, we are
thinking with the Aristotle of the Physics. Martin Heidegger has gone so
far as to suggest that this sort of ‘productive comportment’ towards things
is the decisive characteristic of Western metaphysics. For this reason, he has
dubbed the Physics ‘the hidden and therefore never fully thought through
foundational book of Western philosophy’. See Heidegger, 1976: 242.
Further, when we speak of practical reason, of the pursuit of happiness, of
the organic unity of the community, we are thinking with Aristotle as well,
the Aristotle of the Ethics and Politics, the Aristotle who placed biological
paradigms at the center of his thinking. Thus, we might endorse Adorno’s
rather humorous, but nonetheless true, comment: ‘We speak Aristotle all
our lives “and don’t even know it.”’ See Adorno, 2001: 78.
7 This interpretation of the Metaphysics is strong in Aquinas, and in modern
times it has found expression not only in the work of Hegel, but also, more
recently, in that of Joseph Owens. After the attacks leveled by Jaeger on the
unity of the Metaphysics early in the 20th century, Owens again defends
the position that the Metaphysics is a unified work culminating in the
notion of Being as the pure activity of divine thinking. See Owens, 1978.
Giovanni Reale, himself a defender of the unity of the Metaphysics, gives a
very detailed summary of the scholarship on the status of book XII in Reale,
1980: 312–20.
8 For a discussion of the status of chapter 8 in the Metaphysics, see Jaeger,
1948: 342–67. He argues that XII.8 was written later and marks a clear
revision of Aristotle’s earlier, more ‘Platonic’ theory of the prime mover. For
a different interpretation of the status of chapter 8, see Owens, 1978:
447–54. There Owens argues that chapter 8 is consistent with the rest of
book XII insofar as it never questions the basic doctrine that there is only
one ultimate prime mover of the universe, although it does suggest the
existence of a plurality of unmoved movers (ibid.: 450). In the end, however,
it is precisely the ultimate insistence on the supremacy of one authoritative
hegemonic principle towards which everything is directed that justifies the
talk of a ‘totalizing’ tendency in Aristotle’s conception of God.
9 Bernstein, 1983: 18.
10 Or it could be called ‘Parmenidean’, or ‘Plotinian’, or ‘Thomistic’, or indeed
‘Kantian’. In short, this anxiety seems to have haunted the entire history of
Western philosophy, and the response to it has most often been within the
tradition of Aristotle’s thinking in Metaphysics XII.6–10, namely, to posit
some absolute principle of order through which the totality of beings are
determined. If we may fairly call this sort of thetic maneuver ‘totalizing’,
then, indeed, there is a strong totalizing tradition at work here.
11 Aristotle, 1992: 1071b5. This is just the first example of where these two
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aspects of God’s nature are intertwined in this text. Most often the principle
is called eternal, with the implication that it is also immobile being simply
assumed. References to the eternality of the principle occur throughout
chapters 6–10; a non-exhaustive list of references includes: 1071b21,
1072a27, 1072b29–30, 1073a5, 1075a10.
12 For the necessity of God, see, for example, Metaphysics XII.7 1072b10–14,
XII.10 1075a18–23. For separateness, see XII.7 1073a4. For unaffectabil-
ity, see XII.7 1072a25–7, 1073a11.
13 Metaphysics XII.7 1072a32–4. Ross writes of this: ‘ “One” denotes that a
thing is the measure of something, the unit used in counting an assemblage;
“simple” denotes that a thing is itself in a certain condition, i.e. unmixed.’
See Ross, 1924: II, 376.
14 Metaphysics XII.6 1071b2–11.
15 Nietzsche’s conception of the eternal recurrence is notoriously abstruse. I
appeal to the term here not with the Nietzschean intention of pointing to a
sort of anti-Kantian categorical imperative that teaches one to live each
moment as if it would recur eternally; see Nietzsche, 1974: 273; see too
Kaufmann’s Introduction, pp. 15–21. Rather, it is meant to highlight the
systematic function of the metaphor of the circle which is designed to secure
the order of things by reducing them to a single hegemonic principle, the
focal point around which everything is made to rotate.
16 Metaphysics XII.7 1072a25–30.
17 Ross, 1924: II, 374.
18 Metaphysics XII.7 1073a3–5.
19 Of course, the voice here is ambiguous, for morphologically the perfect
middle and passive participles are the same. I suggest that the term be inter-
preted in the middle voice here due to Aristotle’s own insistence that the
first principle is not affected in any way by that which is other than itself.
20 St Thomas Aquinas seems to proceed in a similar vein: faced with the desta-
bilizing excess of the violence of God’s omnipotent efficient causality,
Aquinas posits an absolute final cause in order to secure the order of the
cosmos, and the absolute authority of God. Richard Lee has outlined the
moves Aquinas makes in this regard and the very Aristotelian conceptual
apparatus he deploys. See Lee, 2001: 29–48.
21 Arguably, this may mark an important difference between Aristotle’s vision
of the first principle and the expression of the Good beyond being in the
sixth book of Plato’s Republic. See, Plato, 1992: 509b5–10. If Plato’s Good
breaches the totality of being, it remains authoritarian insofar as it orders
that which is. Levinas himself seems to affirm Plato’s Good over Aristotle’s
pure activity because of the former’s status beyond being. He does not seem
to consider the authoritarian dimensions of the Good in Plato (Levinas,
1969: 103).
22 Metaphysics XII.9 1074b27.
23 Metaphysics XII.6 1071b21. As mentioned above, the simplicity of the first
principle is established at Metaphysics XII.7 1072a33–5, while its pure
actuality is mentioned in Metaphysics XII.6 1071b21 and XII.7 1072b27–30
to name just two instances.
24 Hegel himself calls it the ‘highest moment [Hauptmoment] of Aristotelian
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philosophy’ because it expresses the identity of the subjective and objective
and thus it anticipates Hegel’s own conception of the speculative idea. See
Hegel, 1986: XIX, 162–3; for the English, see Hegel, 1995: 148.
25 The vocabulary Aristotle uses here in Metaphysics XII.7 to elucidate the
manner of God’s thinking, ‘to dektikon’ (that which is receptive), ‘thig-
ganein’ (to touch), ‘metale¯psis’ (to take a share in), does seem to import a
dimension of potency or receptivity into God’s nature. These terms are all
echoed in the discussion of nous in De Anima book III. There Aristotle
makes an analogy between thinking and sensing, arguing that the thinking
part of the soul ‘must be unaffected [apathes], but capable of receiving
[dektikon] the form and it must be able to be such as this form potentially
but not this [form] itself; and the way in which thinking exists towards that
which is thought is similar to the manner in which sense exists towards that
which is sensed.’ See Aristotle, 1988: 429a15–18. Earlier in the De Anima,
Aristotle offers the proper metaphor according to which the notion of
reception should be understood with respect to sensation. Using the same
term, to dektikon, Aristotle suggests that sense is receptive of the forms
without matter in the manner analogous to the way a piece of wax receives
the impression of a signet-ring. It does not receive the gold or bronze of the
ring, but its form (424a17–25). Without getting into the difficult hermeneu-
tical issues this analogy raises (for a detailed discussion of it, see Slakey,
1961: 470–84), I mention it here only to suggest that the vocabulary
Aristotle uses and the images he seems to have in mind do in fact suggest
that there is even in God’s thinking a receptivity of sorts. However, this is
immediately undermined when Aristotle goes on to suggest that God’s
thinking is better than that of human beings; for according to Aristotle, it
is better precisely because it is devoid of receptivity and thus is eternal.
26 Metaphysics XII.7 1072b24–6.
27 ibid., 1072b28–30.
28 ibid., 1072b8.
29 ibid., 1072b27–8.
30 Aristotle is quite explicit about the fact that God must be without matter
(1071b21, for example) or potency (1074b28–32). Within the context of
Aristotle’s metaphysics, matter and potency, often equated, stand for
precisely the obstreperous principle of difference that threatens the secure
order of the system. Nicolai Hartmann has recognized this, calling matter
‘a moment of the metaphysical resistance against form, energy, purpose,
spirit, etc.’. See Hartmann, 1957: 242. He goes on to suggest that this
moment of resistance is a necessary part of any system of identity if it is to
account for the individual. When considering God, however, Aristotle is
concerned to establish secure order and not, as he perhaps is in the middle
books of the Metaphysics, to account for the being of the individual. This
is clearly indicated by Aristotle’s strong expurgation of matter/potency from
the nature of God’s being.
31 Metaphysics XII.10 1074a13–15.
32 ibid., 1074a18–19. The appeal to the ‘pros hen’ relationship is particularly
interesting in this context insofar as in Metaphysics IV.1 Aristotle famously
organizes the many senses of being by making them all relate to one primary
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sense, namely ‘ousia’, ‘substance’. Here already there is a tendency to reduce
difference to the same, a tendency that will find a more robust and radical
expression in the grand monistic pantheism of a Spinoza.
33 Metaphysics XII.10 1074a19–23. Aquinas too made much of these two
metaphors. Richard Lee points out that a significant advantage the
metaphor of the household has over that of the army general is that in a
household there is a variety of different orders: the rules for the son are
different from those for the wife, and still different are those for the slaves
and livestock; see Lee, 2001: 42–3. Yet in this case too, the father is the
ultimate principle of all orders.
34 ibid., 1076a4–5. Ross suggests that the subjunctive ‘esto¯’, which is missing
from most manuscripts of the Metaphysics, should be supplied for it is
required by the rhythm of the sentence (Ross, 1924: II, 405). The hortatory
subjunctive also fits well with the underlying motive of the citation for it
expresses the command of the speaker. We may agree too with Ross’s caveat
that ‘Aristotle is not a thoroughgoing monist’. He reminds us that God is
not all-inclusive for the world retains matter that is not made by God. This
reminder of a remainder is important, for it suggests that the totalizing
tendency in Aristotle is itself not total, but remains only a tendency without
rising to the level of absolute domination. Further, it reminds us of the
important function of matter as the uncooptable Other of Aristotle’s
system. So long as this Other is affirmed, Aristotle’s system will remain open
and the totalizing tendency be held somewhat in check. A number of
scholars, recognizing this dimension of openness, argue against a grand
cosmological conception of teleology in Aristotle. This can be seen, for
example, in Gill’s treatment of sublunary, sensible ousia and her critique of
the orthodox interpretation of Aristotle’s cosmology; see Gill, 1989: 242.
It can also be seen in the critique leveled by Nussbaum, Balme and Salkever
of those who ascribe an over-arching cosmological conception of teleology
to Aristotle; see Nussbaum, 1985, Balme, 1987, and Salkever, 1990, respec-
tively.
35 In the scene from the Iliad to which Aristotle appeals at the end of XII.10,
Odysseus has taken it upon himself to set the troops in order according to
Agamemnon’s command that the Greeks should not return home but rather
must, despite their obvious desire to the contrary, remain to fight at Troy.
Odysseus is so successful in this that, after Thersites – the single voice of
the people to appear in the Iliad and one who is depicted by Homer in the
most ignoble terms (although his insults against Agamemnon echo those of
Achilles himself) – has been beaten into submission, the multitude praises
the deed as the best of the things Odysseus has done for the Greeks. See,
Murray, 1925: II, line 274. This shift in attitude illustrates the sort of trans-
ference that operates in totalitarian regimes – the ruled are not merely
convinced, they are themselves transformed: the external rule is internal-
ized. While in Odysseus’ case, the rule is literally beaten into the governed,
modern totalitarian regimes have developed sophisticated strategies of
propaganda to instill their ideologies in the hearts of the people. The force
of Odysseus’ scepter has, in modern times, been transformed into the
fearsome power of the mass media.
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36 Arendt, 1973: 325. Herbert Marcuse further emphasizes this point when he
recognizes that the Nazi aesthetic that glorifies classical conceptions and
realistic renditions of beauty is designed to propagate features of submis-
siveness and domination. He writes of these landscapes and paintings: ‘They
transform stimuli for protest and rebellion into stimuli for coordination.
They merge into an order which has succeeded in coordinating even the
most hidden danger zones of individualist society, and they induce the indi-
vidual to like and perpetuate a world which uses him only as a means for
oppression.’ See, Marcuse, 1998: 87–8.
37 Arendt writes: ‘The ideology treats the course of events as though it
followed the same “law” as the logical exposition of its “idea.” Ideologies
pretend to know the mysteries of the whole historical process – the secrets
of the past, the intricacies of the present, the uncertainties of the future –
because of the logic inherent in their respective ideas’ (Arendt, 1973: 469).
I refer to Aristotle’s conception of God as an ‘ideology’ in this sense; for
Aristotle seems to determine the order of being by appealing to this idea.
38 The Michelet edition of the Vorlesungen über der Geschichte der Philoso-
phie (Hegel, 1986: XIX, 156–68), will be, for the most part, employed in
this discussion as the Jaeschke/Garniron edition (Hegel, 1996), does not
clearly delineate the three stages of the development of ousia. The English
translation by Haldane and Simon follows rather closely the Michelet
edition and page references to this edition will be given after references to
the German edition wherever possible. See Hegel, 1995. In general it may
be said that the newest edition of the Vorlesungen by Jaeschke and
Garniron, because it follows closely the course of the lectures as given in
the 1825–6 academic year, gives a more coherent account of what Hegel
actually taught that year. The problem with this is that 1825–6 is rather late
in Hegel’s career, when his ideas about Aristotle were already quite rigidly
set. Thus, although there are significant problems with the Michelet edition,
as suggested by Hoffmeister who criticized it harshly as being too haphaz-
ardly abridged and supplemented by Michelet himself, it still seems to me
to provide the most coherent view of Hegel’s grand interpretation of
Aristotle. For a discussion of the problems with this text and the nature of
Hoffmeister’s critique, see Garniron and Hogemann, 1991: 110–19.
39 Here Hegel, at least according to the Michelet edition, appeals to Meta-
physics XII.1–2, and VII.7. However, precisely what Hegel develops in
speaking about this first stage seems to me more germane to the treatment
of ousia found in the Categories and the first part of Physics A.7. For a brief
discussion of Aristotle’s treatment of ousia in these texts, see Long, 1999:
21–46.
40 Hegel, 1986: XIX, 156.
41 ibid., 157/142. Cf. Metaphysics, VII.7 1032a12–14 where Aristotle writes:
‘every thing generated is generated by something [hypo tinos, Hegel’s “c”],
and out of something [ek tinos, Hegel’s “a”] and it becomes something [(eis)
ti, Hegel’s “b”].’
42 Hegel, 1986: XIX, 157.
43 ibid.
44 ibid.: 158. Hegel takes the notion that something is ‘pre-supposed’, in
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German is ‘vorausgesetzt’, very literally. What he means to say is that it is
posited (gesetzt) from out of (voraus) itself. Thus, the word Voraussetzung
already points to the centrality of mediation for Hegel. That matter is
vorausgesetzt means that we are still at the stage of the first negation –
where matter and (in this case) thought are not yet seen in their mutual
dependence upon one another, but where thought posits matter as other
than itself only then, in a second negation, to recognize this presupposition
as determinative of its own being.
45 Michelet speaks of how excited Hegel’s students were to hear this new
interpretation of Aristotle, an interpretation that directly challenged ‘the
axiom defended by Locke to Kant up to Schleiermacher, that Aristotle was
an unspeculative empiricist’. See Michelet, 1837: II, 686.
46 Hegel, 1986: XIX, 158.
47 Metaphysics XII.6 1071b21.
48 Hegel, 1986: XIX, 159–60.
49 Comparing Aristotle and Plato, Hegel writes: ‘If, in Plato, the affirmative
principle, the Idea only as abstractly self-identical is predominant, then in
Aristotle the moment of negativity – not as change and also not as nothing,
but rather as difference, determining is arrived at and emphasized’ (Hegel,
1986: XIX, 155).
50 ibid.: 166/150–1. For the Aristotelian text, see Metaphysics XII.9
1074b27–35.
51 Hegel, 1986: XIX, 161/146.
52 See, for example, Hegel, 1986: III, 39/21 and Hegel, 1986: XIX, 165/150.
53 ibid.: 163–4/149.
54 Again, comparing Plato to Aristotle, Hegel writes: ‘The Platonic position is
the objective in the universal, but the principle of life is missing; the
principle of subjectivity, not in the sense of an accidental, particular
subjectivity, but rather of a pure subjectivity is peculiar to Aristotle’
(ibid.: 153/139–40).
55 Hegel’s technical use of the term ‘Aufhebung’, which names the dialectical
movement in which a lower stage is both negated and preserved in a higher
stage, and his employment of the term ‘Versöhnung’, or reconciliation, to
name the sort of unity in which the two unified sides retain their distinc-
tion although their opposition is overcome, both go some distance in
affirming difference, but they too are caught up in a logic of progression in
which difference is tolerated only in order that it may find new and deeper
expression in a higher form. For a brief discussion of these two terms, see
Taylor, 1975: 119.
56 Hegel, 1986: 164/149.
57 For a very good and subtle discussion of these sorts of critique as well as the
dangers and limitations of such views, see Stone, 2000. Stone is careful not
to irresponsibly explain the Holocaust exclusively as the inevitable result of
certain tendencies of modernity, nor does he discount the extent to which
the structure of modern thinking helped determine an atmosphere in which
the Holocaust was possible. Further, he recognizes the important dimension
of irrationality that can be eclipsed by attempts to explain the Holocaust
exclusively in terms of the modern totalizing forces of rationalization.
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58 One such other mode of thinking has been traced from Aristotle through
Ockham to Adorno and referred to as the ‘para-metaphysical’ tradition that
runs throughout the history of Western metaphysics in Long and Lee, 2001:
92–112.
59 Hegel falls within a long tradition of Aristotle scholarship that can be
loosely characterized as ‘Thomistic’, for Aquinas’s interpretation of the
Metaphysics clearly situates the discussion of God in book XII at the apex
of the treatise, ending his discussion there and ignoring books XIII and XIV.
A very sophisticated version of the Thomistic reading can be found in
Owens’s The Doctrine of Being. What Owens shares with Hegel is the desire
to follow the trajectory of Aristotle’s thinking, which seems to demand
throughout a treatment of separate substance (1978: 91). To put this
hermeneutical principle in Hegelian terms, although the order of the treatise
is not always fluid and its parts seem to have been rather haphazardly placed
side by side, they still form a systematic totality and this is recognizable if
we follow the trajectory of the development of the speculative Idea (Hegel,
1986: XIX, 133/118 and 152/138). This Idea finds its highest expression in
book XII (Hegel, 1995: 137).
60 Metaphysics VII.11 1036b22–3.
61 The middle books of the Metaphysics continue to be a widely discussed and
variously interpreted text. This is clear from the plethora of new book-
length interpretations of it that have appeared in the last few decades; see,
for example, Gill, 1989; Loux, 1991; Halper, 1989; Witt, 1989; Frede and
Patzig, 1988; and Scaltsas, 1994; to name a few. The following interpre-
tation of the general trajectory of the middle books as well as the import-
ance to the dynamic conception of identity Aristotle develops resonates with
many aspects of L. A. Kosman’s account; see Kosman, 1984 and Kosman,
1994.
62 Metaphysics VII.17 1041b5.
63 ibid., VIII.6 1045b22–3.
64 Kosman has put this quite beautifully when he writes: ‘In order fully to be
itself, a motion must cease to be. Because of this auto-subversive character,
a motion is, so to speak, on a suicide mission. A motion is fully realizable
only posthumously; while alive, it has not yet fully achieved its being. For
the achievement of that being lies in an entity other than itself, in the full
realization that it is destined to bring about only at the expense of its being’
(1994: 203).
65 Metaphysics IX.6 1048b18–35.
66 ibid. 1048b23–6.
67 This discussion can be traced back at least to Ackrill, 1965. The use of the
perfect has often been seen as a test of sorts, one that is allegedly designed
to determine whether an action is strictly speaking a praxis (or energeia) or
if it is merely a kine¯sis. On this view, the ability to use the perfect in conjunc-
tion with the present indicates that the activity is a genuine praxis. See, for
example, Graham, 1980; and Penner, 1970. Kosman has taken issue with
the emphasis on the temporal dimension of the use of the perfect, correctly
suggesting that what is important about the perfect is aspect, not tense.
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Graham too emphasizes the importance of aspect, but Charles Hagen, citing
K. I. McKay, rightly suggests that the progressive aspect is normally given
in Greek by the present and imperfect and that the completed aspect of the
perfect seems to contradict this. Further, Hagen rightly insists that in order
to determine what Aristotle intends with this rather odd formulation, we
should rely on the overall textual context; for there is no real evidence in
the context that Aristotle is concerned to develop a ‘tense test’ designed to
determine whether a given action is a genuine energeia or a mere kine¯sis.
See Hagen, 1984: 268–9. On the whole, my sympathies lie with Kosman
(1984: 124–5), and I tend to think that Aristotle deploys the perfect here,
perhaps somewhat intuitively, to find an expression for an activity that is
both complete and ongoing in itself. It seems to me that too much emphasis
in the literature has been placed on testing whether an energeia is a state or
an activity, and not enough has been placed on the notion that the formu-
lation emerges out of an attempt to develop a dynamic conception of
identity according to which potentiality and actuality can be thought
together. Kosman clearly recognizes this, although he is perhaps too quick
to expurgate the temporal features of the formulation, for it seems to me
that precisely in this formulation Aristotle hits upon the peculiar and new
temporality of praxis in which the past and future are brought together in
the activity of the present.
68 See, for just a few examples, Metaphysics VII.7 1032a25, Physics II.1
193b12–3, Generation of Animals IV.3 767a36ff.
69 Metaphysics IX.6 1048b18–23.
70 As we have seen, Hegel’s appropriation of the notion of entelecheia in
Aristotle succumbs to precisely this delusion whereby substance is under-
stood as subject. From the other side of the history of German idealism,
Heidegger too seems to affirm something similar when he emphasizes the
priority of the future as the ‘primary phenomenon’ of authentic temporal-
ity; see Heidegger, 1986: 329. Taminiaux has powerfully shown how this
conception of temporality is related to Aristotle’s conception of praxis. See
Taminiaux, 1991: 122–37.
71 At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle signals this shift in
the direction and focus of his inquiry when he suggests that it is inappro-
priate to demand absolute precision of the investigation into that which is
contingent. Rather, we must seek only so much precision as the matter will
allow (I.1 1094b12–28).
72 For a more detailed treatment of the meaning of phrone¯sis as discussed in
this context, see Long, 2002.
73 Nicomachean Ethics VI.9 1142a24–31.
74 ibid., VI.11 1143a1–18. Admittedly, this is a rather heavy-handed trans-
lation of synesis, which is often simply rendered as ‘intelligence’ or ‘under-
standing’. Such translations miss the dialogical dimension of the term that
suggests a sort of ‘joining’ or ‘meeting together’. Further, they fail to
recognize the etymological link between synesis and suneide¯sis, or
conscience. The bold translation I suggest is defended in more detail in
Long, 2002: 45ff.
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75 Aristotle develops the notion of epieikeia in the context of his discussion 
of justice in Nicomachean Ethics V.14 1137a32–1138a3. He discusses 
its importance for phrone¯sis in Nicomachean Ethics VI.11–12 1143a1–
1143b14.
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